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The Ricardian insight, revisited by Barro (1974), is that with lump-sum taxes, perfect capital
markets, and dynastic households, changes in the timing of taxes should not aﬀect households’
optimal consumption decisions. Thus the Ricardian theory predicts an equivalence in terms of
prices and allocations between any time paths for taxes that imply the same total present value
for tax revenue. In contrast to this theoretical result, a large amount of empirical work suggests
that the timing of taxes does matter. For example, Bernheim (1987) argues that “virtually
all [aggregate consumption function] studies indicate that every dollar of deﬁcits stimulates
between $0.20 and $0.50 of current consumer spending”. In the hope of reconciling the apparent
gap between the Ricardian view and the empirical evidence, various authors have explored
quantitative theoretical models in which one or more of the conditions for Ricardian equivalence
are not satisﬁed.
First, when taxes are not lump-sum, changes in the timing of taxes will typically aﬀect the
optimal intertemporal allocation of labor eﬀort, consumption and investment (see, for example,
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987, Trostel 1993, Braun 1994, and McGrattan 1994). Second, if asset
market imperfections are such that some households in the economy would like to borrow but
cannot ﬁnd credit, then these households will adjust consumption in response to temporary
tax changes (see Hubbard and Judd 1986, Altig and Davis 1989, Feldstein 1988, and Daniel
1993). Third, Ricardian equivalence will fail if a tax cut reduces the tax burden on the current
generation at the expense of future generations and if intergenerational altruism is imperfect
(see Poterba and Summers 1987). Fourth, households may adjust consumption in response to
temporary tax changes if they myopically ignore the implications of long-run budget balance.
In this paper I consider various alternative model economies in order to quantify the impor-
tance of distortionary taxation, capital market imperfections and imperfect intergenerational
altruism for generating deviations for Ricardian equivalence. I do not experiment with alterna-
tives to the rational expectations assumption, and assume throughout that households always
assign the correct probability to each possible future sequence for tax rates.
Capital market imperfections are modeled following the approach developed by Bewley (un-
dated), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Heterogeneous households receive idiosyncratic
shocks to labor eﬃciency which cannot be insured. They can reduce the sensitivity of consump-
1tion to income changes by accumulating precautionary holdings of a single asset. However, if
asset holdings ever reach zero then further dis-saving is prohibited; households face a borrow-
ing constraint. Since households diﬀer in their productivity histories, the model generates an
endogenous cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings.
The tax rate in the model is stochastic, so households face aggregate as well as idiosyncratic
risk. Real government consumption and transfers are assumed constant, in order to isolate the
eﬀects of changes in the timing of taxes from other aspects of ﬁscal policy. The process for taxes
is such that the share of aggregate output paid in taxes has the same persistence and variance
as in the post-war United States, and such that the ratio of debt to GDP remains bounded.
I consider both lump-sum and proportional tax systems. When taxes are proportional to
income, changes in the tax rate temporarily alter the returns to saving and to working, encour-
aging intertemporal substitution in consumption and labor supply. The intuition for why the
borrowing constraint generates real eﬀects from tax changes is straightforward. Households that
are unfortunate enough to have both very low asset holdings and low current income would like
to borrow against future income to increase consumption. They are unable to do so because
of the borrowing constraint. If the government cuts taxes, such households can now increase
consumption by the extent to which the tax cut raises disposable income. In this framework,
the magnitude of the response of aggregate variables to tax changes depends on the fraction of
households that are wealth-poor and thus potentially borrowed-constrained. I therefore specify
the process for labor productivity so that the model endogenously generates a distribution for
asset holdings resembling that in the United States. At the same time, the productivity process
is restricted to be consistent with empirical estimates of the variance and persistence of wages.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that a combination of distortionary taxation and capital
market imperfections can give rise to quantitatively important departures from Ricardian equiv-
alence. For example, in simulations of the benchmark incomplete-markets model, income tax
rate cuts from 34.2 percent to 31.8 percent are associated with an average immediate increase
in aggregate consumption of 28.8 cents for each dollar of tax revenue lost.1 Simulation of a
1 The long run implications of debt accumulation in this type of economy are explored by
Aiyagari and McGrattan 1998, who ﬁnd that increasing the steady-state level of debt crowds out
aggregate capital, raises the real interest rate, and reduces per-capita consumption. A higher
real interest rate makes assets less costly to hold and therefore more eﬀective in smoothing
2similar economy with complete asset markets indicates that most of this consumption response
is attributable to the distortionary nature of the tax system rather than the presence of the
borrowing constraint. However, in the incomplete-markets economy, the average percentage in-
crease in consumption following a tax cut is almost twice as large as the increase in investment,
while investment responds more strongly to tax changes than consumption when asset markets
are assumed to be complete. Intergenerational redistribution of the tax burden is the least
important source of non-neutrality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I review the empirical
evidence on the response of aggregate consumption to tax changes, and the evidence on the
importance of liquidity constraints at the household level. Section 3 contains a description
of the model economies, along with a discussion of the choices for parameter values and the
numerical solution methods. Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical evidence
There is a large and rather inconclusive literature that tests for Ricardian equivalence (RE) by
estimating consumption functions or Euler equations on aggregate time series (see, for opposing
conclusions, the surveys in Bernheim 1987 and Seater 1993). One explanation for the lack
of consensus is the problem of endogeneity. Cardia (1997) illustrates how the coeﬃcient on
the current budget deﬁcit in an estimated consumption function (in which both output and the
budget deﬁcit are treated as independent variables) may be uninformative regarding the validity
of RE if output responds immediately to tax changes. A second potential problem is that if
current tax changes imply expected future government expenditure changes, then consumption
might respond even if RE is true. As a third example, even if RE is false, consumption might
not respond to anticipated tax changes; this is a central implication of the permanent income /
life cycle hypothesis (PILCH) model.
Given these diﬃculties, several authors have looked at various interesting natural experi-
ments in which households saw large and reasonably well-understood changes in their disposable
income. Various studies of the 1968 surtax and the 1975 rebate ﬁnd quite large changes in aggre-
gate consumption from these explicitly temporary tax changes. Modigliani and Steindal (1977)
individual consumption. Woodford 1990 examines similar questions in a more stylized model.
3use large scale econometric models and estimate a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) over
two quarters out of the 1975 rebate of between 0.3 and 0.58. Blinder (1981) examines both tax
changes using a model based on the permanent income hypothesis and estimates a MPC of 0.16
over a quarter. Poterba (1988), using an Euler-equation-based estimation, reports a MPC of
between 0.13 and 0.27 within a month.2 Wilcox (1989) ﬁnds large eﬀects on consumption from
the sequence of increases in social security beneﬁts since 1965, even though these increases were
always announced at least six weeks in advance.
Studies based on micro data have typically found even larger consumption responses to
policy-induced income changes. Looking at the pre-announced Reagan tax cuts and using data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), Souleles (2003) estimates a very large MPC
for non-durables of between 0.6 and 0.9. Parker (1999), also using the CEX, estimates a MPC
for nondurable goods of 0.20 for income changes associated with predictable changes in social
security tax with-holding. Souleles (1999) ﬁnds the MPC out of predictable income tax refunds
to be between 0.35 and 0.6 within a quarter. Finally, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995 and 2003)
report that 43 percent of survey respondents planned to spend most of the extra disposable
income associated with the 1992 reduction in the standard rate of income tax with-holding,
while 22 percent planned to spend most of the income tax rebates associated with Bush’s Tax
Relief Act in 2001.
This apparent sensitivity of U.S. consumption to predictable changes in taxes or transfers
is often attributed to the presence of liquidity constraints. What other evidence (in addition
to the response of consumption to tax changes) supports the view that borrowing constraints
aﬀect a large fraction of the population?
Borrowing constraints should have the largest impact on those households closest to the
constraint, an implication that has been repeatedly exploited in empirical work on panel data.
In a sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Zeldes (1989) identiﬁes the
wealth-poorest and richest households. He rejects a permanent-income-hypothesis-based Euler
2 Poterba also ﬁnds that consumption did not appear to respond signiﬁcantly to the passage of
ﬁve large tax bills (including the 1968 and 1975 changes), even though it did respond when these
tax changes were eventually implemented. The ﬁnding that aggregate consumption responds to
predictable tax changes is in principle consistent with optimal forward-looking behavior if some
households are borrowing constrained.
4equation for the poor, estimates a positive missing multiplier (suggesting they face a binding
borrowing constraint), and ﬁnds that they exhibit excess consumption growth.3 Further cross-
sectional evidence consistent with the presence of borrowing constraints is that households with
low asset holdings appear to consume too little and have too little debt (see Hayashi 1985, and
Cox and Jappelli 1993).4
In the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance, Jappelli (1990) ﬁnds that 12.5 percent of households
report having requests for credit rejected, while a further 6.5 percent do not apply because they
expected credit to refused. Thus, according to this measure, 19 percent of the U.S. population
was liquidity constrained on at least one date in the year or two prior to the survey. Jappelli
also ﬁnds that 74.1 percent of those households whose net worth is less than 15 percent of their
disposable income are liquidity constrained, suggesting that wealth-poor households are much
more susceptible to ﬁnding themselves in the position of wishing to borrow but being unable to
ﬁnd credit. Gross and Souleles (2002) ﬁnd that increases in credit card limits generate immediate
and signiﬁcant increases in debt, and that the propensity to consume out of extra liquidity is
much larger for people near their credit limits.
Because both theory and empirical evidence suggest a close connection between the charac-
teristics of having low wealth and being unable to borrow, it is important to know how many
wealth-poor households there are in the United States. Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull
(1997) report that in 1992 the poorest 40 percent of households held only 1.35 percent of total
wealth, that approximately 3.4 percent of households had zero wealth, and that another 3.5
percent had negative wealth (suggesting that these households were able to take out imperfectly
collateralized loans).5
3 Euler-equation-based tests may not be the best way to identify the presence of borrowing
constraints. In the models described in section 3, the borrowing constraint is typically binding
for very few households in equilibrium (so the Euler equation is satisﬁed with equality for most
households), yet the presence of the constraint aﬀects the consumption and savings decisions of
every household in the economy. See Attanasio 1999 for more discussion of this point.
4 Souleles 1999 ﬁnds that on receipt of tax refunds, the nondurable consumption of those with
low asset holdings rises much more than that of the rich. However, neither Souleles 2003 nor
Parker 1999 ﬁnd much evidence of a link between low asset holdings and excess sensitivity of
consumption to predictable changes in income.
5 Weicher 1997 investigates the position of households with negative net worth in some detail.
In 1992 only 11.8 percent of those households with negative net worth (or 0.57 percent of the
total population) had net worth of less than -$10,000.
5Overall, these numbers suggest that a large fraction of the population may be at or near to
their borrowing limit, and that this limit is close to zero. In the model described below I assume
that no borrowing is permitted. To the extent that non-collateralized borrowing is possible,
the constraint imposed here is too tight. To the extent that certain types of wealth such as
consumer durables are too illiquid to be readily adjusted to smooth through income shocks, it
is too loose.
3. The Models
I start with some very simple models and gradually add layers of realism. In particular, begin-
ning with a complete-markets, exogenous-labor, ﬁxed-price, lump-sum-taxation, inﬁnite-horizon
setting, I sequentially incorporate asset market incompleteness, endogenous labor supply, en-
dogenous factor prices and proportional taxation.6 All these economies are closely related, so
rather than describe each in ﬁne detail, in the remainder of this section I focus on the version
with incomplete markets, endogenous labor supply, closed-economy-equilibrium prices and pro-
portional taxation. I shall refer to this as the benchmark model, since it is the richest and the
most realistic. After describing the details of this economy, I outline the calibration strategy
and the numerical solution method.
A large (measure one) number of households are ex ante identical and inﬁnitely-lived (or,
equivalently, perfectly altruistic towards their children). They maximize expected discounted
utility from consumption and leisure. In aggregate, household savings decisions determine the
evolution of the capital stock, which in turn determines aggregate output and the return to
saving.
Households face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, and markets which in principle could
allow complete insurance against this risk are assumed not to exist. Instead there is a single
risk-free savings instrument which enables households to partially self-insure by accumulating
precautionary asset holdings. Given this market structure, a household with positive wealth
responds to a fall in household income by temporarily dis-saving. An important assumption
is that no borrowing is permitted, which limits the ability of low-wealth households to smooth
6 In the appendix, I also consider the implications of adding an age dimension to the house-
hold’s problem.
6consumption in the face of falls in their disposable income.
The government ﬁnances constant government spending by issuing one period debt and
levying taxes. Contrary to the assumption in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), the tax level
is stochastic. The presence of aggregate risk means that in equilibrium there is intertemporal
variation in the joint distribution over productivity and wealth.
Individual states
A household’s eﬀective labor supply depends both on the hours it works and on its household-
speciﬁc labor productivity, which is stochastic. At any date t, a household’s productivity takes
one of l values in the set E. Each household’s productivity evolves independently according
to a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with transition probabilities deﬁned by the l × l matrix Π.T h e
probability distribution at t over E is represented by a row vector pt ∈ Rl, where pt ≥ 0 and
Pl
i=1 pit =1 . If the probability distribution at date 0 is given by p0 the distribution at t is
given by pt = p0Πt. Given certain assumptions (which will be satisﬁed here) E has a unique
ergodic set with no cyclically moving subsets and {pt}
∞
t=0 converges to a unique limit p∗ for any
p0. Thus, given a population of measure 1, we can reinterpret pt as describing the distribution
of the population across productivity states at date t. I assume that p0 = p∗, and impose an




There are two assets in this economy (capital and government debt) but by assumption they
will pay the same return state-by-state. Thus the household eﬀectively has access to a single
savings instrument. Let A be the set of possible values for a household’s holdings of this asset. I
assume that a household’s wealth at the start of period 0, denoted a−1, is non-negative and that
households are never able to borrow. This may be thought of either as an ad hoc borrowing limit
or as the appropriate endogenous constraint for an economy in which there is no punishment
for default. Thus A ⊂ R+. Let (A,A) and (E,E) be measurable spaces where A denotes the
Borel sets that are subsets of A and E is the set of all subsets of E. Let et = {e0,...,et} denote
a partial sequence of productivity shocks from date 0 up to date t, and let es(et) denote the
sth element of this sequence (s ≤ t). Let (Et,Et),t=0 ,1,... denote product spaces, and deﬁne
probability measures
µt : Et → [0,1],t =0 ,1,... (3.1)
where, for example, µt(et) is the probability of individual history et.
7Aggregate states
The aggregate state of the economy at date zero, z0,i sd e ﬁned by two objects: a measure λ :
A×E→ [0,1] describing the distribution of households across individual wealth and individual
productivity at time 0, and the date 0 level of government debt B−1.7
The only source of aggregate uncertainty in the model is the stochastic process for the
economy-wide tax rate. This means that (given z0) the aggregate state of the economy at t can
be described by the history of the tax rate from date 0 up to and including date t. Ic a l lt h i s
object the aggregate history to date t, and denote it ht. Let τs(ht) denote the sth element of
this sequence. Let (ht,Ht),t=0 ,1,... denote product spaces, and deﬁne probability measures
νt : Ht → [0,1],t =0 ,1,... (3.2)
where, for example, νt(ht : z0) is the probability of aggregate history ht. I shall use the notation
ht º ht−1 to indicate that ht is a possible continuation of ht−1.
The household’s problem
In period 0, each household chooses labor supply, savings and consumption for each possible
sequence of individual productivity shocks and aggregate tax shocks, given the individual and
aggregate states (a−1 and z0). Let the sequences of measurable functions
nt : Ht × Et → [0,1]
at : Ht × Et → A
ct : Ht × Et → R+

   
   
t =0 ,1,... (3.3)
describe this plan, where, for example, at(ht,e t) denotes the choice for savings that will be
implemented at t if the aggregate history to date t is ht and the individual history is et. Note
that choices for consumption and labor supply have to be non-negative after every history, and
labor supply cannot exceed the total time endowment which is equal to 1.


















7 The dependence of aggregate variables on z0 and the dependence of household speciﬁc
variables on a−1 are henceforth generally suppressed in the interests of brevity.
8where β is the subjective discount factor. For the benchmark version of the model, I assume













Here γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ε is the intertemporal (Frisch) elasticity of
labor supply.8
The pre-tax real return to supplying one unit of eﬀective labor at date t is given by the
measurable function wt : Ht → R. Similarly, the net one-period pre-tax return to one unit of
the asset purchased at t − 1 after history ht is rt(ht). The tax rate at t is assumed to take one
of two possible values, τt(ht) ∈ T = {τl,τh}. In the benchmark version of the model, taxes are
proportional, and apply equally to both asset and labor income. Thus the household budget






















for all et ∈ Et such that et º et−1, for all ht ∈ Ht such that ht º ht−1, for t =0 ,1,..., and
where a−1(h−1,e −1)=a−1.
The solution to the household’s problem is a set of decision functions (3.3) that maximize eq.
3.4 taking as given (i) the household budget constraints (3.6), (ii) the price and tax functions
wt,r t and τt, (iii) the probability measures (3.2 and 3.1), and (iv) the initial state (a−1,z 0).
Production
Aggregate output after history ht,Y t(ht), is produced by competitive ﬁrms according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt(ht)=Kt−1(ht−1)αNt(ht)1−α ht º ht−1
where Kt−1(ht−1) denotes the capital stock in place at the start of period t, Nt(ht) denotes
aggregate eﬀective labor supply, and α ∈ (0,1). Output can be transformed into private con-
8 The utility function is only deﬁned for c ≥ 0,n≥ 0, and c ≥ ψ n1+1/ε
1+1/ε .
9sumption, government consumption, and new capital according to
Ct(ht)+Gt(ht)+Kt(ht)=Yt(ht)+( 1− δ)Kt−1(ht−1) ht º ht−1 (3.7)
where Ct(ht) denotes aggregate private consumption, Gt(ht) denotes government consumption,
and δ ∈ [0,1] is the rate of depreciation.
Labor supply
The utility function given in eq. 3.5 has the convenient property that the labor supply
choice is independent of the consumption / savings choice. In particular, assuming an interior
solution, optimal individual labor supply is a simple function of the household-speciﬁca f t e r - t a x







Note that optimal labor supply does not depend on household wealth or on the history of
productivity shocks up to t−1. In the context of this heterogenous agents model, these properties
have the useful implication that equilibrium aggregate eﬀective labor supply depends only on
the inherited aggregate capital stock, the current economy-wide tax rate, and the time-invariant
















Real government spending is assumed constant and equal to G. Real government debt issued
at date t is denoted Bt(ht). Income from debt and income from capital are assumed to be
taxed at the same rate. After any history debt is assumed to pay a pre-tax one-period real
return equal to the economy-wide rate of return rt(ht). In versions of the model with either
lump-sum taxation or exogenous labor supply, the one-period-ahead pre-tax return to capital is
known, since next period capital is determined before observing next period’s tax rate. Thus
in these cases return equalization emerges as a property of equilibrium rather than reﬂecting
an assumption about debt policy; one-period debt must oﬀer the same pre-tax rate of return
10as capital if households are to be willing to hold both. More generally, the advantage of having
debt and capital pay the same return state by state is that households do not have to keep track
of how their wealth is divided between capital and debt or solve a portfolio choice problem.9











where ht º ht−1 and B−1(h−1)=B−1.
The process for taxes
The observation that the eﬀects of current tax changes cannot be studied independently of
the future tax changes that they imply is at the heart of the Ricardian equivalence proposition.
However, even if government spending is held constant, many diﬀerent paths for taxes are
consistent with a stationary debt to GDP ratio.
The approach taken in this paper is to impose exogenous constant bounds on the level of
debt issued by the government in the period, Bt(ht) ∈ D =[ Dl,D h], and to assume that the tax
rate follows a Markov process such that if initial debt lies in the set D, then future debt always
remains within D. This is implemented by ensuring that debt is always falling when τ = τh
and always rising when τ = τl, and by specifying transition probabilities such that for values of
Bt(ht) close to Dh the probability of the high tax is always 1, while for Bt(ht) close to Dl it is
always 0.10 There is evidence that this is a reasonable speciﬁcation for taxes. In particular, Bohn
(1998) ﬁnds that the U.S. government has historically responded to increases in the debt-GDP
ratio by raising the primary surplus, and that the debt-GDP ratio is mean-reverting once one
controls for war-time spending and cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Let πτ : T × D × T → [0,1] denote the time invariant transition probability function for
taxes, where πτ ((τ,B),τ0) is the probability that next period’s tax rate is τ0 given that the
9 One example of an alternative assumption in the endogenous-labor, proportional-tax case
w o u l db et oh a v ed e b to ﬀer a risk-free one-period pre-tax return. However, the diﬀerence between
this alternative and the assumed debt policy is likely to be small. The reason is that the pre-tax
return to assets is already close to risk-free. The only shock in the model that aﬀects this return
is the tax shock, and the only way tax shocks aﬀect the pre-tax return is by aﬀecting hours,
which in turn are relatively tax-insensitive.
10 Dotsey and Mao 1997 take a similar approach.
11current tax rate is τ and the amount of new debt issued is B. The speciﬁcation for πτ adopted
is as follows:













where D and D are simple functions of Dh and Dl,a n dλ ∈ (0,1].
One feature of this speciﬁcation is that the expected duration of a low tax regime is decreasing
in B, the indebtedness of the government, while the expected duration of a high tax regime is
increasing in B. The parameter λ controls the persistence of tax levels. If λ =1 , then the
probability distribution over next period’s tax rate is independent of the current rate. Reducing
λ reduces the probability of a change in tax levels, conditional on a particular value for B.
Aggregate labor supply (eq. 3.9) is a increasing function of aggregate capital and a decreasing
function of the tax rate. Thus a large capital stock improves the government’s ﬁscal position
via three channels: (i) more capital by itself implies more output and tax revenue, (ii) more
capital raises the marginal product of labor, implying more labor supply and a further increase in
output, and (iii) more capital implies a higher capital / labor ratio and thus lower interest rates
and debt servicing costs. It is immediate that the government’s ﬁscal position is also improved
the lower is outstanding government debt and the higher is the current tax rate (assuming we
are on the left side of the Laﬀer curve). Let κ =[ Kl,K h] denote a set such that in equilibrium
aggregate capital always lies in this set.11 Taken together, the preceding observations imply
that suﬃcient conditions for the upper bound on debt Dh not to be violated are:
τh ≥
r(Kl,N(Kl,τh))Dh + G




Dh − G + τl [w(Kl,N(Kl,τl))Nl(Kl,τl)+r(Kl,N(Kl,τl))Kl]
1+r(Kl,N(Kl,τl))(1 − τl)
. (3.12)
where factor prices are marginal productivities, and aggregate eﬀective labor supply is given by
eq. 3.9.
The ﬁrst condition says that conditional on the tax level being high, debt is non-increasing
for all values for inherited debt B ∈ D and for all values for inherited capital K ∈ κ. The second
11 Appropriate values for Kl and Kh are determined within the numerical solution procedure.
12condition says that for all levels of inherited debt consistent with a low current tax level (i.e.
∀B<D), new debt issued does not exceed Dh.
Similar conditions guarantee that the lower bound on debt Dl is not violated. The calibration
section describes how values are assigned to Dh,D l,τ h,τ l and λ while ensuring that the
conditions guaranteeing boundedness are satisﬁed. The parameters D and D are then set so
that eq. 3.12 and the analogous condition for the lower bound on debt are satisﬁed with equality.
3.1. Deﬁnition of equilibrium
An equilibrium for the benchmark economy is a set of functions et,a t,c t,n t,w t,r t,τ t,K t,
Bt,N t,C t,Y t, probability measures µt and νt, and an initial state z0 =( λ,B−1) such that
∀ht ∈ Ht, ∀et ∈ Et, ∀a−1 ∈ A and ∀t =0 ,1,...
1. at,c t, and nt solve the household maximization problem.
2. {µt(·)}
∞
t=0 is consistent with the transition matrix Π,s ot h a t∀s ∈ {1,...,t},
µs(es)=µs−1(es−1)Πij,
where es = {e0(et),...,es(et)}, and the subscripts i and j indicate that es−1(et)=ei and
es(et)=ej. Note that µ0(e0)=p∗
i where the i subscript indicates that e0(et)=ei.
3. {νt(·)}
∞








Ia s s u m et h et a xr a t ei sl o wi np e r i o d0. Thus ν0(h0)=1if τ0(ht)=τl and 0 otherwise.



















135. The market for savings clears:
Kt−1(ht−1)+Bt−1(ht−1)=At−1(ht−1)
where B−1(h−1)=B−1 and A−1 =
R
A×E a−1dλ.
6. Factor markets clear:
rt(ht)=αKt−1(ht−1)α−1Nt(ht)1−α − δ, (3.14)
wt(ht)=( 1 − α)Kt−1(ht−1)αNt(ht)−α, (3.15)
where ht º ht−1. Note that combining 3.13 and 3.15 gives 3.9.
7. The goods market clears (3.7).
8. The government budget constraint (3.10) is satisﬁed and Bt(ht) ∈ [0,∞).
3.2. Calibration
The model period is one year, the most appropriate horizon for considering tax changes. Table
1 contains parameter values that are common to all the model economies considered. Table 2
contains the parameter values that diﬀer across economies. For every economy, the calibration
strategy is essentially the same. In what follows I therefore focus on the benchmark incomplete-
markets model with proportional taxes.
Production technology and preferences
The parameters relating to aggregate production are standard: capital’s share in the pro-
duction function α is set equal to 0.36 and the depreciation rate is 0.1.
The risk aversion parameter in the utility function, γ, is set to 1, and the discount factor, β,
is 0.96. Given a value for ε, the intertemporal (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, the parameter
ψ is set so that aggregate eﬀective labor supply is equal to 0.3.
The appropriate value for ε is important and somewhat controversial (see Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999 for a survey). MaCurdy (1981) estimates this elasticity to be in the range 0.1
to 0.45 for prime-age males. Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) study married women in the
U.K. and estimate Frisch labor supply elasticities in the 0.5 to 1.0 range. I use a relatively
14conservative value of 0.3, in part because there is little evidence of large labor supply responses
to the changes in marginal tax rates that occurred during the 1980s (see Slemrod and Bakija
2000).
Although the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1998) speciﬁcation for preferences is
widely used in quantitative work (Marimon and Zilibotti 2000 and Neumeyer and Perri 2001 are
recent examples), it is appropriate to discuss two properties of this functional form. The ﬁrst
property has already been discussed: labor supply is not aﬀected by household wealth or the level
of non-labor income. Given a baseline value of 0.15 for the Frisch elasticity, MaCurdy estimates
that hours worked are virtually unresponsive to changes in permanent non-wage income, virtually
unresponsive to temporary income changes associated with temporary wage changes, and only
mildly responsive to income changes associated with permanent wage changes. Recent evidence
from lottery and inheritance studies suggests that market hours do respond to unanticipated
changes in wealth, but that the elasticity is small; for every dollar increase in wealth, earnings
decline by about one cent. Large wealth eﬀects as a result of unanticipated capital gains during
the stock market boom of the late 1990s are also hard to ﬁnd; Cheng and French (2000) document
that the participation rates of older age groups who beneﬁted most actually increased.
A second implication of the Greenwood et. al. speciﬁcation is that consumption and leisure
are substitutes, in the sense that reducing hours worked reduces the marginal utility of con-
sumption.12 Substitutability is consistent with the tendency of consumption and market hours
to co-move over the life-cycle, as originally pointed out by Heckman (1974).
The household productivity process
The response of aggregate variables to tax changes will depend on the distribution of wealth
in the model economy, and in particular on the fraction of households on or close to the borrowing
constraint. The reason is that these households are likely to have the highest propensities to
consume out of additional disposable income. In the model described above, heterogeneity
is generated endogenously as a consequence of households receiving uninsurable idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Thus the speciﬁcation of the process for these shocks is critical.
I follow Domeij and Heathcote (2003) in searching for a process for idiosyncratic labor pro-
12 Preferences that are CRRA in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of consumption and leisure also
have this property if the co-eﬃcient of risk aversion is greater than unity.
15ductivity that satisﬁes two criteria. The ﬁrst criterion is that the process for wages is broadly
consistent with empirical estimates from panel data. The second criterion is that the model econ-
omy generates realistic heterogeneity in terms of the distribution of wealth, and in particular,
comes close to replicating the bottom tail of the observed wealth distribution.
I assume that l, the number of elements in the set E, is equal to three, since Domeij and
Heathcote ﬁnd this to be the smallest number of states required to match overall U.S. wealth
concentration and at the same time reproduce the fact that the wealth-poorest two quintiles
hold a positive fraction of total wealth. Thus E = {e1,e 2,e 3}, where the subscripts 1, 2 and 3
denote low, medium and high productivity respectively. I also assume that households cannot
move between the high and low productivity levels directly, that the fractions of high and
low productivity households are equal, and that the probabilities of moving from the medium
productivity state into either of the others are the same. Thus the matrix Π is deﬁned by just
















Once mean productivity has been normalized to unity, the productivity process is com-
pletely characterized by a total of four independent parameters: two levels and two transition
probabilities.
Many papers in the quantitative macroeconomics literature adopt simple AR(1) speciﬁcations
for wages or earnings.13 Such a process may be summarized by the serial correlation coeﬃcient,
ρ, and the standard deviation of the innovation term, σ. Various authors have estimated these
parameters using data from the PSID. Allowing for the presence of measurement error and the
eﬀects of observable characteristics such as education and age indicates a ρ in the range 0.88
to 0.96, and a σ in the range 0.12 to 0.25.14 I therefore impose two restrictions on the Markov
process for productivity: (i) that the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient equals 0.9, and (ii)
13 I discuss alternatives to the AR(1) speciﬁcation in a technical appendix which is available
on the Review of Economic Studies web site.
14 See, for example, Card 1991, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995 and Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante 2003. Heaton and Lucas 1996 allow for permanent but unobservable household-
speciﬁce ﬀects, and ﬁnd a much lower ρ of 0.53, and a σ of 0.25.
16that the variance for productivity is 0.05/(1 − 0.92), corresponding to a standard deviation for
the innovation term in the continuous representation of 0.224. These are very close to the point
estimates of Flodén and Lindé (2001), who consider a model with a labor supply choice and
therefore focus explicitly on a process for wages rather than earnings.
The choices for ρ and σ imply two restrictions on the set of four parameters that characterize
the process for wages. I adjust the two remaining free parameters to seek to match two properties
of the empirical asset holding distribution: the Gini coeﬃcient and the fraction of aggregate
wealth held by the two poorest quintiles of the population. Using data from the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances, Díaz-Giménez et. al. (1997) report a wealth Gini of 0.78, and ﬁnd that
the two poorest quintiles of the distribution combined hold 1.35 percent of total wealth.
The calibration procedure, described in detail in Domeij and Heathcote (2003), delivers pa-
rameter values that satisfy all four criteria. Thus uninsurable ﬂuctuations in wages that exhibit
realistic volatility and persistence can account for U.S. wealth inequality. The implied frac-
tions of households in the high and low productivity states at each point in time are small:
p∗
1 = p∗
3 =0 .053 in the benchmark economy.15 Thus a relatively small fraction of households
enjoy relatively high productivity, and since productivity shocks are persistent, end up accu-
mulating a large share of aggregate wealth. This is the ‘trick’ for getting a small fraction of
households to hold a large share of total wealth, implying a high value for the Gini coeﬃcient.
By contrast, in the benchmark model of Krusell and Smith (1998) inequality is generated by
unemployment shocks that are asymmetric in the opposite sense - a relatively small fraction of
the population (the unemployed) have very low productivity, while all workers (the vast ma-
jority) share the same productivity level. In this case, wealth ends up being relatively evenly
distributed among a large majority of the population, implying a Gini index of only 0.25.
Table 3 provides a comparison between the asset holding distribution observed in the data,
and the average distribution observed over a long simulation of the various model economies.
The only respect in which the models do a relatively poor job is in terms of accounting for
the substantial wealth holding of the richest 1 percent of households. Table 3 also reports
15 On average, low, medium and high productivity types devote respectively 17, 27, and 44
percent of their time endowments to market work in the benchmark economy. One might
therefore interpret the low productivity state as the realization of such a low wage that the 5.3
percent of households in this state choose to be largely unemployed.
17the correlations between wealth, pre-tax labor earnings, and pre-tax income. The correlation
between earnings and wealth is of particular interest, since it is those agents with both low
wealth and low productivity who are most likely to be borrowing-constrained. This correlation
is 0.36 in the benchmark incomplete-markets model, versus 0.23 in the data.16
Adding up ﬁxed private capital and the stock of durables owned by consumers, Aiyagari
and McGrattan (1998) report a capital-to-annual-output ratio of 2.5. Note that (by chance)
the benchmark model reproduces this ﬁgure exactly. Given the choices for capital’s share, the
depreciation rate, and tax rates, this implies an average annual real after-tax return to saving of
3.0 percent, a reasonable compromise for an economy in which stocks and bonds pay the same
rate of return.17
The tax process
All other model parameters relate to ﬁscal policy. The tax system in the benchmark model
is represented by a single ﬂat-rate tax that applies equally to capital and labor income.18 For
agents who are not borrowing constrained, it is the marginal tax rate that is important for
savings and labor supply decisions. However, for households for whom the constraint is binding,
it is the average tax rate that determines the level of consumption, given a choice for labor
supply. Since I am interested in the role of borrowing constraints as a propagation mechanism,
I calibrate to average rather than marginal tax rates. Because there is a single tax rate in the
model, the appropriate empirical average tax rate is the ratio of total government receipts to
GDP.
The mean ratio of total (federal plus state and local) annual government current receipts to
GDP in the United States between 1946 and 1999 was 0.26.19 This ratio has grown through time,
16 Figure 1 in the technical appendix contains density functions describing the average (simu-
lation) distribution of asset holdings across the entire population and distributions conditional
on productivity.
17 Note that the average equilibrium after-tax interest rate is less than the households’ rate of
time preference. This reﬂects precautionary savings in the face of uninsurable risk (see Aiyagari
1994) and implies an endogenous upper bound on household asset holdings.
18 In reality, the tax that a household pays is a complicated function of its income, and of the
source of this income. See Altig and Carlstrom 1999 or Castae neda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull
2003 for examples of treatments of non-linear tax schedules.
19 Data on tax revenue and GDP is from the National Income and Product Accounts, Tables
1.1 and 3.1, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
18from 0.23 in 1946 to 0.30 in 1999. Since there is no long-run growth in the size of government
in the model, I ﬁrst remove a linear trend from the revenue to GDP series in the data before
computing the volatility and autocorrelation of the series. The detrended annual series has a
standard deviation of 0.009 and autocorrelation equal to 0.63.20 Thus aggregate tax shocks are
both much less persistent and much less volatile than idiosyncratic wage shocks. The average
ratio for total government debt to GDP over the period 1946 to 1996 was 0.67.21 In 1946 the
value was 1.36; the post-war low of 0.47 was achieved in 1979.
There are six parameter values to be determined: the value for constant government con-
sumption G, tax rates τl and τh, bounds on government debt Dh and Dl, and the persistence
parameter λ. These parameter values are chosen simultaneously to approximately satisfy six
criteria: (i) the average ratio of tax revenue to GDP in the model is 0.26, (ii) the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation of the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is 0.63, (iii) the standard deviation of the
ratio of tax revenue to GDP is 0.009, (iv) the average ratio of government debt to GDP is 0.67,
(v) high tax and low tax regimes are equally persistent, and the unconditional probability of
being in either regime is 0.5, and (vi) debt remains bounded for every possible history for tax
rates ht.22 In a 10,000 period simulation of the benchmark economy, the average duration of a
tax change turns out to be 5.0 years.
3.3. Numerical solution
It is known to be diﬃcult to solve for an equilibrium in economies with heterogeneous agents, in-
complete markets, and aggregate uncertainty. I therefore adopt the strategy proposed by Krusell
and Smith (1998).23 In particular, I assume that when solving their problems, rather than using
all of the information about the aggregate state of the economy contained in ht, households
20 The Congressional Budget Oﬃce has estimated a series for the eﬀective total federal tax
rate. The mean and standard deviation of the ‘all families’ series between 1977 and 1999 are
respectively 22.9 percent and 0.009.
21 Data on debt is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States published by the Census
Bureau. Data for 1996, for example, are from table no. 493 in the 2000 edition of the Abstract.
22 Details of a numerical procedure that delivers parameter values with the desired properties
are given in the technical appendix.
23 Den Haan 1997 proposes a similar algorithm. Other papers to implement the Krusell and
S m i t ha p p r o a c hi n c l u d eC a s t a e neda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull 1998, and Storesletten Telmer
and Yaron 2001.





useful implication of the Greenwood et. al. (1988) utility function is that given Zt, current prices
can be computed using equations 3.9, 3.14 and 3.15. Thus households do not make mistakes in
‘forecasting’ current prices. I then consider a recursive formulation of the household’s problem
in which households take as given a law of motion for aggregate capital G : κ×D×T → κ. The
solution to the household’s problem is a decision rule of the form a0 : E × A × κ × D × T → A.
Given decision rules, the economy is simulated forward, and a regression is run on the simulated
data to update the coeﬃcients in the forecasting rule G. This procedure is repeated until con-
vergence, at which point the forecasting rule G that households take as given is such that their
behavior generates a law of motion for capital for which the best predictor function (of the same
functional form as G) is precisely the forecasting rule G.24
Figure 1 contains the benchmark economy equilibrium decision rules for consumption and net
savings, given each possible combination of household-speciﬁc productivity and the economy-
wide tax rate.25 Consumption is an increasing function of wealth, while net savings is decreasing
in wealth. Low productivity households are universally dis-savers, while high productivity house-
holds are net savers except at very high levels of wealth. For households with high productivity,
the optimal consumption and savings rules are close to linear in wealth, while for less produc-
tive types, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is decreasing in wealth. That
this is attributable to the presence of the borrowing constraint is evidenced by the fact that
non-linearities are most pronounced at very low levels of wealth, and for households with the
lowest value for productivity.
It is important to evaluate the forecasting rule G by examining the magnitude of forecasting
errors for capital and the implied errors in forecasting future factor prices. For the models
considered in this paper, the diﬀerences between actual future prices and forecasted future
prices are very small and on the order of those encountered by Krusell and Smith. For example,
the cumulative forecasting error for the net pre-tax interest rate (the marginal product of capital
24 In the technical appendix on the Review of Economic Studies website I describe in detail.the
revised household problem, the numerical procedure for solving this problem, implementation
of the Krusell and Smith iteration procedure, and measurement of forecasting accuracy.
25 In ﬁgure 1 aggregate capital and debt are set to their average equilibrium levels. Mean
household wealth in equilibrium is the sum of aggregate capital and aggregate debt. To magnify
non-linearities, decision rules are plotted only for low to moderate values for household wealth.
20minus the depreciation rate) at a ten year horizon rarely amounts to more than two tenths of a
percent diﬀerence between the predicted value for the interest rate (conditional on the realized
sequence for taxes) and the actual value observed in the simulation. As an alternative metric,
the absolute diﬀerence between the predicted rate and the realized rate over a ten year horizon is
rarely more than one hundredth of a percentage point. Thus it is hard to imagine that improving
forecasting accuracy (by expanding the set of information in Zt) would lead to large changes in
individual decision rules or the aggregate behavior of the economy.
Why is it that higher moments of the wealth distribution do not seem to be very useful for
forecasting future prices? The intuition is similar to that given in Krusell and Smith. First, note
that if the saving rule were exactly linear in wealth then redistributing wealth among agents
with a particular productivity realization would have no eﬀect on aggregate savings. In light of
the shape of the savings rules in ﬁgure 1, redistributing wealth between agents with moderate
or greater wealth will therefore have little eﬀect on aggregate savings. Recall, however, that
at low levels of wealth the marginal propensity to save out of wealth is increasing in wealth.
Thus wealth redistributions between very poor households and richer households could impact
total savings. There are several reasons why this is not an important problem in practice.
First, the shape of the wealth distribution does not change much through time; for example,
from ﬁgure 2 the poorest 40 percent of households always account for between 0.8 percent
and 1.8 percent of aggregate wealth. Second, households with low savings propensities account
for a disproportionately small fraction of aggregate economic activity in general and aggregate
consumption in particular. Third, other variables in the forecasting rule for capital contain
information that partially substitutes for more detailed information about the shape of the
wealth distribution. For example, the correlation in a simulation between the Gini coeﬃcient
for asset holdings and the level of debt is −0.91.
4. Results
The quantitative theoretical analysis proceeds as follows.
First, I consider a version of the model described above in which taxes are lump-sum. I also
abstract from the potential eﬀects of tax changes on factor prices and hours worked. This is
an illustrative starting point (if somewhat unrealistic) since Ricardian equivalence will obtain
21if asset markets are complete. Thus any real eﬀects from temporary tax changes when markets
are incomplete will be directly attributable to the presence of the borrowing constraint coupled
with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
Second, I endogenize labor supply and compare the response of the heterogeneous-agent
incomplete-markets economy to lump-sum taxes changes in both a small open economy and a
closed economy setting. In the closed economy version, the responses of savings and labor supply
to tax shocks aﬀect equilibrium factor prices. By comparing the open and closed economies,
I can assess the extent to which equilibrium price adjustment aﬀects households’ savings and
labor supply decisions.
Third, I introduce proportional taxation, and once again compare economies with complete
and incomplete markets. The incomplete markets version is the benchmark model described
above. Since prices are determined endogenously, tax shocks now aﬀect the returns to working
and saving, and therefore have real eﬀects irrespective of the asset market structure.
In the appendix, I introduce some life-cycle considerations. I extend the incomplete-markets
model described in step three to capture the fact that income tends to rise with age. I then build
an over-lapping-generations economy to address the quantitative importance of wealth eﬀects
in the absence of intergenerational altruism.
Parameters relating to the household productivity process and the process for taxes are
recalibrated for each new economy so that each reproduces the targeted features of the U.S.
wealth distribution, and so that the ratio of tax revenue to GDP has the same persistence and
variance as in the U.S.26
4.1. Lump-sum taxes
In the ﬁrst stage of the analysis, I consider a small open economy facing a constant world
interest rate r∗. Taxes are lump-sum and each household supplies N =0 .3 hours per period;
the period utility function is u(c)=l n ( c). The restrictions on parameter values ensuring that
debt remains between the speciﬁed bounds Dl and Dh (see eqs. 3.11 and 3.12) are adjusted
appropriately to account for these diﬀerences relative to the benchmark model. To ensure that
26 I also experimented with a more persistent tax process, and found this to have quantitatively
minor eﬀect on the results; see the technical appendix for details.
22low-productivity, low-wealth households can realize a positive marginal utility of consumption
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fl u m p - s u mt a x e s ,Ia s s u m et h at the government makes constant lump-sum
transfers φ to households, and that government consumption is always zero.27







=( 1+r∗)at−1(ht−1,e t−1)+wt(ht)et(et)N + φ − τt(ht).
Government debt now evolves according to
Bt(ht)+τt(ht)=( 1+r∗)Bt−1(ht−1)+G.
The deﬁnition of equilibrium for the incomplete markets version of this economy is similar to
that given in sub-section 3.1, except that the savings-market-clearing condition does not apply,
the goods-market-clearing condition contains a net exports term, and eq. 3.14 is replaced by
r∗ = αKt−1(ht−1)α−1N1−α − δ. (4.1)
The intuition behind eq. 4.1 is that capital will ﬂow freely and instantaneously into or out of
the economy to exhaust any arbitrage opportunities arising from interest rate diﬀerentials. This
implies that the capital stock and thus the wage and aggregate output are constant.
I choose a value for r∗ such that, on average, the net foreign asset position in the economy is
zero. Thus the average ratio of aggregate household wealth to income will be similar to that in the
closed-economy model considered in the next section. Note that in this class of heterogeneous-
agent incomplete-markets models the net foreign asset position is guaranteed to be stationary,
as long as the after-tax interest rate is less than the household’s rate of time-preference.
Results with lump-sum taxes
Results for the economies with lump-sum taxes, exogenous hours and exogenous factor prices
are presented in tables 4 and 5.
Consider the aggregate eﬀects of tax changes across a 10,000 period simulation of the
economy during which values for the tax rate are drawn according to the speciﬁed stochas-
tic process.28 The focus of the paper is on the responsiveness of aggregate consumption to tax
27 This becomes more of an issue in the next section, when labor supply is endogenized.
28 An initial joint distribution across individual states was taken from an economy without
aggregate uncertainty (see the technical appendix). The full-blown economy was then simulated
for 11,000 periods before computing statistics for the last 10,000 periods of the sample.
23changes. One simple way to measure this sensitivity is as the change in consumption between
two consecutive periods characterized by diﬀerent tax rates, relative to the change in tax revenue
between the same two periods. A value of zero for this statistic, which I call the propensity
to consume out of income tax (PCT), would indicate that in aggregate households behave in a
Ricardian fashion, and adjust private saving rather than consumption in response to tax changes.
With complete markets, lump-sum taxes and inﬁnite horizons, debt and taxes are equivalent
sources of ﬁnance and the PCT is zero. This reinforces the point that tax changes have no real
eﬀects in this framework unless households are potentially borrowing constrained.
When markets are incomplete and households face a borrowing constraint, they do not reduce
savings one-for-one in response to a tax cut. Thus aggregate consumption rises (see table 4).
Looking at all periods in which taxes fall, the mean increase in aggregate consumption per dollar
d e c l i n ei nt a xr e v e n u ei s13.5 cents. The ﬁgure for tax increases is very similar.
I also examine behavior at the household level, since households with diﬀerent asset holdings
and wages exhibit very diﬀerent responses to tax changes. The ﬁgures reported in table 5
are ratios of the diﬀerence in household consumption across the two tax rates relative to the
diﬀerence in household tax payments.29 The consumption of low-productivity households with
zero wealth varies one for one with the lump-sum tax level, since they do no saving irrespective of
the tax rate. As wealth increases, the gap between optimal consumption in the two tax regimes
narrows, indicating that households are increasingly willing to use their assets to consumption-
smooth through tax shocks. Similarly, high wage households are net savers, and assign low
probability to the possibility of transiting to the low wage state in the near future. Thus these
households also behave in a Ricardian fashion.
4.2. Endogenizing factor prices
I now endogenize labor supply and factor prices. I label the incomplete-markets economy with
lump-sum taxes, endogenous hours and exogenous prices the ‘open economy’. In tables 6 and
7 I compare the open economy model to an otherwise identical economy in which prices are
endogenous; this is the ‘closed economy’.
29 All the ﬁgures in tables 5, 7, 9 and 11 are computed given an average (over a 10,000 period
simulation) joint distribution over asset holdings and productivity, and an average quantity of
government debt.
24In the open-economy version, the assumption of a constant world interest rate pins down a
constant capital / labor ratio, as before. This in turn implies a constant wage rate and, given
the lump-sum tax version of eq. 3.8, constant aggregate hours, capital, and output. In the
closed-economy version, aggregate capital, hours, output and factor prices are all time-varying.
The aggregate response to tax changes in the open economy model is similar to that in the
incomplete-markets model with exogenous labor supply considered in the previous sub-section:
the PCT is 14.9 cents per dollar. When prices are endogenized, the value for this statistic drops
to 11.4 cents per dollar. The reason for the smaller response is that the increase in aggregate
consumption following a tax cut is now ﬁnanced by a fall in investment rather than a fall in
n e te x p o r t s ;i n v e s t m e n tf a l l sb y0.66 percent on impact. This translates into higher expected
future interest rates. High productivity or high wealth households (who assign low probability to
being borrowing-constrained in the near future) respond to the increase in the expected return
to saving by increasing saving and reducing consumption. Thus high productivity households
actually consume more when the tax level is high than when it is low, conditional on a given
level of asset holdings (see the bottom panel of table 7).
4.3. Introducing distortionary taxation
I now introduce proportional taxation, and compare an economy with complete markets with
the benchmark incomplete-markets model described in detail in section 3.I n t h e c o m p l e t e -
markets economy, markets exist which allow households to fully insure against idiosyncratic
productivity risk, and against any distributional eﬀects from aggregate tax shocks. I therefore
adopt the representative agent abstraction, and assume that the representative household’s labor
productivity is constant and equal to one. Since the representative agent is never borrowing
constrained, non-lump-sum taxation is the only source of Ricardian non-neutrality in this case.
Aggregate eﬀects
When taxes are proportional to income, tax cuts increase the price of leisure relative to
consumption, and thus increase labor supply and pre-tax income. Given the functional form of
the utility function, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply (eq. 3.9) with respect to (marginal







The implied value for η is around −0.13.A c r o s s a 10,000 period simulation the average per-
centage increase in hours following a tax cut is 0.91 in the complete-markets economy and 0.97
percent in the incomplete markets economy (see table 8).30
The increase in labor supply and pre-tax income when taxes are cut means that tax cuts
generate large increases in household income. Much of this extra income is saved, so that
investment rises sharply even as the government issues new debt. However, extra investment
reduces the equilibrium return to saving, so it is optimal to use some fraction of additional
income to increase consumption.31 An additional reason why consumption increases following
a tax cut is that consumption and leisure are substitutes in utility. Thus when hours increase,
the marginal utility of consumption rises.32
On average across a simulation of the complete-markets economy, a switch from the high
tax rate to the low rate is associated with a 23 cent increase in consumption for every dollar of
tax revenue lost in the complete-markets economy (see table 9). The PCT rises to 29 cents per
dollar when markets are incomplete. This is six times larger than the largest response one can
attribute purely to intergenerational redistribution of the tax burden (see the appendix). Given
that output responds similarly in the two economies, an implication of the larger consumption
response in the incomplete-markets model is that the investment response must be smaller.
Indeed, when markets are incomplete, the average impact increase in consumption is much
larger than the rise in investment (0.92 versus 0.56 percent), whereas investment responds most
strongly when markets are complete. The reason for the larger consumption response in the
30 Note that tax changes in the model are not marginal, and also that average tax rates
diﬀer slightly across market structures (see table 2). Thus the average labor supply and output
responses to tax changes are not identical across market structures.
31 It is not immediately obvious that consumption must increase when taxes are cut, since a
persistent tax cut signals a high expected after-tax return to saving. In fact, in a version of the
complete-markets model with exogenous labor supply, consumption and taxes move together
(though in this case consumption responds very little to tax changes).
32 In the technical appendix I report results for a version of the complete-markets economy
in which preferences are log-separable in consumption and leisure. I ﬁnd that the response of
consumption to tax changes has the same sign and is similar in magnitude to the response under
the baseline non-separable preference speciﬁcation.
26incomplete-markets model is, of course, that low-income households on or close to the borrowing
constraint view a tax cut as an opportunity to increase consumption.
Figure 2 contains scatter plots of the PCT in the incomplete-markets model for the 1007
periods during the simulation in which the tax rate went up and the 1006 periods in which the
tax rate fell. There is little diﬀerence between the average response of aggregate consumption
to tax decreases versus tax increases. There is, however, some variation through time: the
response to tax cuts ranges from 25.5 to 31.5 cents per dollar change in tax revenue. The
top-left panel of the ﬁgure shows that tax decreases tend to have larger eﬀects on aggregate
consumption the smaller is the fraction of total wealth accounted for by the poorest 40 percent
of households (indicating a large fraction of borrowing-constrained households). The positive
relation between the wealth share of the poorest households and the level of government debt
(see the two bottom panels) indicates that even poor households behave in a mildly Ricardian
fashion, increasing private savings when the government reduces public saving.
There are some important diﬀerences between the models considered here and previous
quantitative work on distortionary taxation. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and
Trostel (1993) assume that the duration of tax changes is known in advance. Nonetheless, my
results appear broadly consistent with their ﬁndings. In particular, both Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
and Trostel ﬁnd that income tax reductions crowd in capital in the short run.33 Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ ﬁnd an immediate propensity to consume out of a ﬁve-year income-tax cut of around
34 cents per dollar decline in tax revenue.34
Heterogeneity in the consumption response
I now discuss the sensitivity of diﬀerent types of household to changes in the proportional tax
rate in order to better understand the relative roles of (i) borrowing constraints, (ii) distortions
on the labor-supply margin, and (iii) distortions on the savings margin (see table 9 and the
decision rules in ﬁgure 1).
For high-productivity households, the borrowing constraint is of little concern, as in the econ-
33 Comparing the magnitude of the percentage increase in investment with these authors’
results is tricky since they abstract from capital depreciation.
34 Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ do not report the consumption response directly. Nonethless it is
possible to construct a consumption series using (i) the value for constant government consump-
tion (table 5.1), (ii) the implied values for output and investment given information on hours
and capital (table 6.1), and (iii) the appropriate aggregate resource constraint.
27omy with lump-sum taxes. The primary channel through which tax shocks aﬀect the behavior
of these households is by altering their incentive to work. Thus high-productivity households
work and consume more in the low tax state than in the high tax state, irrespective of their
level of asset holdings.
By contrast, for households with low productivity and very low wealth, the borrowing con-
straint is binding for both tax rates. The diﬀerence in consumption across tax regimes is larger
than the diﬀerence in tax payments because labor supply and pre-tax income is lower when
taxes are high. In this sense, endogenous labor supply magniﬁes the importance of the borrow-
ing constraint. At higher wealth levels, incentives to save become more important, oﬀsetting
the positive eﬀect on consumption of higher labor supply and income. Thus low-productivity
households with above-mean wealth consume less in the low tax state than in the high tax state.
For medium-productivity households consumption is ‘excessively’ sensitive to the tax rate
at low levels of wealth, but the borrowing constraint is never binding for these households, and
thus even at zero wealth, medium productivity households respond to tax changes by adjusting
both consumption and savings.35
While the combination of missing insurance markets coupled with borrowing constraints
implies large responses for some households, these do not translate into particularly large eﬀects
at the aggregate level. For example, the aggregate propensity to consume out of a tax cut in the
benchmark economy is less than 6 cents larger than in the complete-markets version. Why is the
diﬀerence between the two market structures smaller than in the environments with lump-sum
taxes?
First, relative to a speciﬁcation with lump-sum taxes, proportional tax shocks imply relatively
small and thus easily-smoothed changes in disposable income for low-income households. Thus
the quantitative importance of borrowing constraints for changes in taxes (or transfers) depends
on the details of how taxes are related to income. Second, the households whose consumption
is most tax sensitive are also the households with the lowest levels of equilibrium consumption:
35 There is a literature focussing on insurance eﬀects which operate when missing insurance
markets mean that distortionary tax changes aﬀect the inter-temporal distribution of idiosyn-
cratic risk (see, for example, Chan 1983 and Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes 1986). In the model
developed here these insurance eﬀects are not quantitatively important since taxes are strictly
proportional to income, and there are no transfers.
28the bottom quintile of households ranked by wealth account on average for only 10.8 percent of
aggregate consumption while the top quintile accounts for 44.7 percent.36 Thus the decisions of
wealthier households for whom the borrowing constraint is of little concern are disproportionately
important at the aggregate level.
5. Conclusions
In the model economies studied here, income tax changes have real eﬀects both because they
distort labor supply and savings decisions, and also because missing insurance markets coupled
with a borrowing constraint limit households’ ability to smooth consumption through time. The
response of aggregate consumption to simulated tax shocks is typically large, and is consistent in
sign and magnitude with many empirical estimates of the eﬀects of historical tax changes in the
United States. A temporary tax increase in the benchmark model economy reduces aggregate
consumption by around 29 cents for every additional dollar of tax revenue raised.
Most of the response of aggregate consumption to tax changes in these models is attributable
to the fact that ﬂat-rate taxes are distorting. At the same time, the asset market structure is
important for both the magnitude and the composition of aggregate responses to tax shocks.
Aggregate consumption responds most strongly in models that incorporate both the distor-
tionary eﬀects of proportional taxes and the liquidity eﬀects that arise in an incomplete-markets
environment.
Aggregate measures of the eﬀects of tax changes hide wide variation in the response at the
household level. I ﬁnd that the consumption of low-income low-wealth households is the most
sensitive to changes in the tax level, and that this sensitivity is primarily attributable to the
borrowing constraint. In a simulation of the benchmark model there are typically many wealth-
poor households (as in the United States). Thus the mean percentage change in household
consumption following a tax change is also large. At the same time, richer households account
for a disproportionately large fraction of total consumption, and the consumption of these house-
h o l d si sl e s ss e n s i t i v et oc h a n g e si nt h et a xr a t e. This suggests a possible explanation for why
36 Cutler and Katz 1992 report that in the U.S. in 1988 the lowest quintile of the consumption
distribution accounted for 7.5 percent of spending while the top quintile accounted for 37.2
percent.
29empirical work based on micro data has often found larger eﬀects from tax changes than are
apparent in aggregate data.
While the paper focuses primarily on consumption, it also sheds some light on the empirical
response of investment to tax shocks. Tax changes that aﬀect the user price of capital appear
to have very little eﬀect on investment in the short run (see, for example, Chrinko, Fazzari and
Meyer 1999), which has led researchers to introduce adjustment costs or measurement error.
In the complete-markets model studied here, investment increases strongly in response to an
income tax cut. However, the response is much weaker when asset markets are incomplete
and households are potentially borrowing constrained. The reason is simply that although tax
cuts do temporarily increase the return to saving, households close to the borrowing constraint
prefer to spend tax cut dollars rather than save them, which reduces total national saving and
investment. Once again, the lesson is that the aggregate eﬀects of a particular change in tax
policy will depend on how it impacts liquidity-constrained households.
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6. Appendix: Life-cycle considerations
Here I consider two economies. The ‘stochastic-aging economy’ is designed to capture the
idea that liquidity constraints may be most important for younger individuals who are at the
bottom of an upward-sloping lifetime earnings proﬁle. The ‘over-lapping-generations economy’
is designed to isolate the quantitative importance of intergenerational tax redistribution in the
absence of intergenerational altruism. I will argue that incorporating either of these two eﬀects
has quantitatively minor eﬀects on the results.
The stochastic-aging economy
In this economy, I model the life-cycle in a highly stylized fashion, so that the stochastic-
aging economy reduces to a version of the benchmark model in which the process for household
productivity shocks is suitably modiﬁed. The innovation is that on top of the labor productivity
risk described above, households now also face aging risk. For a household with low (medium)
productivity, aging amounts to transiting to the medium (high) productivity state. A high pro-
ductivity household who ages transits to the low productivity state; the household is eﬀectively
replaced by a newborn successor who inherits all the ﬁnancial assets of the parent, but none of
the parent’s human capital. Details on the construction of the transition probabilities for this
economy, described by the matrix b Π, are in the technical appendix.
Relative to the benchmark economy, low and medium productivity agents now attach higher
probability to a productivity increase. Thus we may expect these households to exhibit lower
demand for precautionary savings, and for their consumption to be more tax-sensitive.
34The responses of all aggregate variables to tax shocks in the stochastic aging economy turn
out to be very similar to those in the benchmark model: the PCT is 30.1 cents per dollar
compared to 28.8 cents in the benchmark model. A comparison of tables 9 and 11 reveals that
the sensitivity of consumption to the tax rate for households with diﬀerent characteristics is also
similar across the two economies.
Table 3 suggests some clues as to why incorporating positive expected wage growth does not
have much eﬀect on the propensity to consume out of tax cuts. First, the equilibrium interest
rate is higher in the stochastic-aging economy than in the benchmark incomplete-markets model;
3.3 versus 3.0 percent. The interest rate is higher because high productivity households do not
get to accumulate as much wealth, since they are now subject to death (i.e. low productivity)
risk. A higher interest rate makes it less costly to adjust savings in response to temporary tax
shocks. The second clue is that the correlation between earnings and wealth is lower in the
stochastic aging economy (0.14 versus 0.36 in the benchmark model) since relatively wealthy
households now transit from the high to the low productivity state. Recall that the households
whose consumption is most tax sensitive are those with both low wealth and low earnings, so a
weaker correlation between wealth and earnings tends to reduce the quantitative importance of
the borrowing constraint.
The over-lapping-generations economy
The natural framework for focussing on the role of intergenerational redistribution of the
tax burden is the workhorse over-lapping-generations model developed, among others, by Auer-
bach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). To isolate the intergenerational redistribution eﬀect, I consider an
environment in which, if households were perfectly altruistic (as in all the economies considered
so far), tax changes would have no real eﬀects. Thus I abstract from market incompleteness,
distortionary taxation, and the labor supply choice.
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households. At any date t a new cohort
is born with mass normalized to one. I denote by a the number of years of experience in the
labor force, which I shall also refer to as a household’s age. From the time of entering the
labor force, the maximum duration of remaining life is A. Agents face mortality risk, with the
probability of surviving from age a to a +1equal to sa. Mortality risk ensures a realistic age













t+a(ht+a) denotes the consumption in year t + a of a (living) agent with current age a
given history ht+a. Note that households are not altruistic towards other cohorts.
I assume that households face no idiosyncratic shocks to income. In addition, households
can borrow or lend freely, subject only to the constraint that, conditional on surviving to the
maximum possible age, they can always repay any outstanding debts while enjoying non-negative
consumption. Households are born with zero assets. Intermediaries pool savings each period
and redistribute savings plus interest in an actuarially-fair way among survivors. The only risk
households cannot insure against is the risk that lump-sum tax shocks will increase or reduce
their cohort’s share of the overall tax burden.
I assume that the economy is small and open, and takes the world interest rate r∗ as given.
To further simplify things, I assume that 1+r∗ =1 /β, so that in the absence of any tax shocks,
each agent’s consumption would be constant across the life-cycle.37 Since taxes are lump-sum
and labor supply is exogenous, aggregate capital, labor and the wage rate are all time invariant.
I assume that individuals supply N units of labor per year until age R, after which they supply
zero hours but receive a lump-sum public pension P from the government. The budget constraint
for an agent of age a at date t is
ca
t(ht)+saaa
t(ht) ≤ w∗N +( 1+r∗)a
a−1
t−1(ht−1) − τt(ht)+ψa>RP (6.1)
where ψa>R is an indicator that takes the value one beyond retirement age, and sa captures the
survivor’s premium associated with the presence of annuity markets.
From the household’s perspective there is no economic diﬀerence between labor income and
pension income, so the particular choices for N, R and P are not crucial. Older households
with lower survival probabilities will be the most eager to consume out of tax cuts. I therefore
consider two alternative assumptions: (i) all households pay the same lump-sum taxes, or (ii)
retired households are tax-exempt.
37 The presence of annuity markets is essential for this implication.
36Agents enter the labor force on their 20th birthday, retire on their 60th birthday, and live to
a maximum age of 109. These assumptions pin down R and A. Survival probabilities are taken
from the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1989-91 published by the National Center for Health
Statistics, and are for the total population. The parameters β, α and δ are set to the same values
used in the economies previously studied. The lump-sum pension is set such that on average
aggregate wealth is equal to capital plus debt, implying a zero net-foreign-asset position. The
implied replacement rate is 36 percent of working-age labor income when everyone pays taxes,
and 0 when retirees are tax exempt. The process for taxes is calibrated following exactly the
same procedure as in the economies previously discussed.
In a 10,000 period simulation of the version of this economy in which everyone pays taxes,
the mean aggregate response of consumption to tax cuts is very small; for every dollar lost in
revenue, consumption increases on impact by only 5 cents (see table 11). This number is very
similar to those reported by Poterba and Summers (1987) and Hubbard and Judd (1986). The
corresponding ﬁgure for the version in which retirees are tax-exempt is only 4 cents.
How does the average response vary by age? Considering the version in which everyone
pays taxes, for every dollar of revenue lost when taxes are cut 21 year-old households increase
consumption by only 0.6 cents, 30 year-olds by 0.9 cents, 50 year-olds by 2.6 cents, 70 year-olds
by 7.9 cents, 90 year-olds by 24.9 cents and 109 year-olds by 73.9 cents. Clearly the wealth eﬀect
is working as expected: older households with lower expected lifetimes have a higher propensity
to consume out of temporary tax cuts. However, for most households life expectancy is long
relative to the duration of tax cuts. Thus most households do not expect a large fraction of a
tax cut to be paid for by future generations. This is why so few households optimally consume
a big chunk of a tax cut (less than 2% of the population is over 90).
Introducing intergenerational altruism would reduce the response of consumption to tax
changes. As in the inﬁnite-horizon economies previously considered, endogenizing the interest
rate would also reduce the consumption response. Making taxes proportional to income rather
than lump-sum would reduce the consumption response to the extent that older people have
lower incomes. Thus I conclude that 4 or 5 cents per dollar is an upper bound for the propensity
to consume out of tax cuts driven purely by intergenerational redistribution.
37 
Table 1. Parameter values and simulation targets common across economies 
 
PARAMETERS SET OUTSIDE THE MODEL 
Preferences  β 0.96  Production  α 0.36 
  γ 1.0    δ 0.10 
  ε 0.3       
         
SIMULATION TARGETS 
1 
Wealth distribution  Debt / GDP 
Mean Gini  0.78  Mean 0.67 
Mean wealth poorest 40%  1.35%   
  Tax revenue / GDP 
Log household productivity  Mean 0.26 
Standard deviation  0.51  Standard deviation 0.01 
Autocorrelation 0.9  Autocorrelation 0.63 
 
 
                                                 
1 These target values apply to a 10,000 period simulation. In the complete markets and over-lapping-
generations economies, household productivity is constant and the wealth distribution targets do not apply.  
Table 2. Parameter values varying across economies 
 
ECONOMY 
    Lump-sum taxes  Proportional taxes
2 OLG 
   Fixed  labor, 













Preferences  ψ  0 100  100  50 35 65  0 
           
Productivity  e1  0.213 0.235 0.235 0.184  1.0  0.177  1.0 
  e2  0.848 0.839 0.839 0.850  1.0  0.817  1.0 
  e3  3.940 3.845 3.845 4.382  1.0  4.212  1.0 
  Π3,3  0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900    0.674   
  Π2,2  0.986 0.985 0.985 0.988    0.969   
           
Fiscal
















  τh  0.248 0.248 0.248 0.342 0.327 0.337 0.247 
  τl  0.267 0.267 0.266 0.318 0.303 0.313 0.267 
 D h  0.88 0.93 0.94 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.90 
 D l  0.46 0.41 0.40 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.44 
  λ  0.29 0.30 0.31  0.325  0.38 0.31 0.36 
 
 
                                                 
2 In all the economies with proportional taxes, labor supply and prices are endogenous. 
3 The fiscal policy parameters are: the mean simulation ratios of transfers and government consumption to GDP, mean ratios of the high and low lump-sum tax 
levels to GDP in the economies with lump-sum taxes and high and low tax rates in the economies with proportional taxes, the high and low debt bound 
parameters as fractions of mean GDP, and the tax persistence parameter.  





5  Lump-sum taxes  Proportional taxes  OLG 
Fixed labor  Flex labor     








prices   
Wealth 99-100
6  29.6 11.4 11.2 11.2 11.5    6.8   
Wealth  90-100 66.1 60.1 60.3 60.3 60.3    40.5   
Wealth  80-100 79.5 83.9 84.1 84.1 84.0    62.9   
 Correlations
7   
Earnings-income  0.93 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.96    0.98   
Earnings-wealth  0.23 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.36    0.14   
Income-wealth 0.32 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.60    0.36   
  
Capital to GDP ratio  2.50  2.76 2.87 2.87 2.50 2.24 2.42 2.54 
Interest rate %
8    3.04 2.56 2.56 2.96 4.17 3.28 4.17 
 
                                                 
4 The model properties are averages over a 10,000 period simulation. 
5 Empirical wealth distribution statistics are from Diaz-Gimenez et. al. 1997 and are based on data from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finance.  
6 Fractions of total wealth held by the wealth-richest 1 percent, 10 percent and 20 percent of households. 
7 Income and earnings are pre-tax and pre-transfers in the data and in the models. 
8 The interest rate is the net after-tax interest rate.  
 
Table 4.  Responses to tax cuts: economies with lump-sum taxes, fixed labor, fixed prices 
 
  Percentage change on impact
9  PCT 














Incomplete Markets  -7.13  0.0  0.0 0.36 0.0  -13.5 
Complete Markets  -7.13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
 
Table 5.  Consumption sensitivity to the tax rate for different households: economies with lump-
sum taxes, fixed labor, fixed prices 
 
   Productivity (ei) 
Incomplete Markets  Wealth (ai)  Low Medium High 
Zero  -1.00 -0.37 -0.03 







τ τ τ τ






, ,  
Mean  -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 




Table 6.  Responses to tax cuts: incomplete-markets economies with lump-sum taxes, endogenous 
labor 
 
  Percentage change on impact  PCT 














Open Economy  -7.12  0.0  0.0 0.40 0.0  -14.9 
Closed Economy  -6.97  0.00 0.02 0.30 -0.66  -11.4 
 
Table 7.  Consumption sensitivity to the tax rate: incomplete-markets economies with lump-sum 
taxes, endogenous labor 
 
   Productivity (ei) 
Open Economy  Wealth (ai)  Low Medium High 
Zero  -1.00 -0.43 -0.03 







τ τ τ τ






, ,  
Mean  -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
Zero -1.00  -0.40  0.08 
Median (0.06 × Mean)  -0.38  -0.18  0.08 
Closed Economy 
Mean -0.02  0.03  0.12 
 
 
                                                 
9 Averages over a 10,000 period simulation.  
Table 8.  Responses to tax cuts: economies with proportional taxes 
 
  Percentage change on impact  PCT 














Incomplete Markets  -6.24  0.97 0.62 0.92 0.56  -28.8 
Complete Markets  -6.39  0.91 0.57 0.71 0.80  -23.2 
 
Table 9.  Consumption sensitivity to the tax rate: economies with proportional taxes. 
 
   Productivity (ei) 
Incomplete Markets  Wealth (ai)  Low Medium High 
Zero  -1.28 -0.58 -0.36 







τ τ τ τ






, ,  
Mean  -0.01 -0.21 -0.34 




Table 10.  Responses to tax cuts: economies with life-cycle features. 
 
  Percentage change on impact  PCT 














Stochastic Aging  -6.34  0.96 0.62 0.95 0.45  -30.1 
OLG Economy  -7.19  0.0  0.0 0.15 0.0  -4.9 
 
Table 11.  Consumption sensitivity to the tax rate: economy with stochastic aging 
 
   Productivity (ei) 
Stochastic Aging  Wealth (ai)  Low Medium High 
Zero  -1.28 -0.59 -0.37 







τ τ τ τ






, ,  
Mean 0.14  -0.20  -0.33 
 